Abstract
Introduction
It is widely believed that unions allow their members to benefit from a rent (Bennett & Kaufman 2007 ). As such, it is not surprising to observe that union members are more likely than their non-unionized counterparts to feel that it would be hard to find a job with similar wage and fringe benefits in the event that they were to become unemployed. What is puzzling, however, is that the same union members are also more likely to feel insecure about their current job (Aaronson & Sullivan 1998 , Brochu & Zhou 2009 ). For instance, the American General Social Survey reveals that 14.2 percent of union workers are insecure about their current job, while only 10.5 percent of non-union workers report the same concern. These figures are surprising as standard labor economics textbooks suggest that one of the principle purposes of a union is to protect the jobs of its members. The main goal of our paper is to investigate the causes of the positive correlation between union membership and current job insecurity.
Understanding the link between union membership and perceived job insecurity is important as perceptions can have a direct impact on economic outcomes. Within a search framework, for example, current job insecurity can affect (on-the-job) search intensity. More generally, increased fear of job loss may have an effect on bargaining, and ultimately on wage outcomes (Campbell et al. 2007 ); heightened insecurity regarding future job 1 prospects can affect the wage determination process as it reduces the worker's outside option. Finally, perceived job insecurity can influence workers' consumption/investment patterns as insecure workers could delay making important purchases or investments. The fact that union workers are more insecure about future jobs is intuitive. If unions succeed in raising wages (Card 1996 , Blanchflower & Bryson 2004 ) and non-wage benefits (Budd 2005) , and the number of union jobs is constrained (Farber 1990) , it would be harder for a displaced union worker to find a job with similar wages and non-wage benefits (Kuhn & Sweetman 1998) . But, the link between unions and current job insecurity is not as straightforward as it seems. The positive correlation could simply be due to worker or firm self selection-'worriers' self-selecting into unionized jobs (Aaronson & Sullivan 1998) , or unions emerging in environments where job security is a problem (Freeman & Medoff 1984) . Some potential explanations as to why unionized workers have lower job satisfaction than non-unionized workers could also apply to perceived job security (see for example Hammer & Avgar (2005) ). The same way union leaders can generate discontent among workers by increasing expectations about job quality (Hammer & Avgar 2005) , they can also affect workers' sensitivity about job security issues; unions may breed perceptions of job insecurity, possibly to justify their presence. Finally, unions could also affect workers' perceived job security through the adversarial nature of collective bargaining and its impact on the workplace climate (Kaufman 2005 , Fiorito 2007 ).
Unions could also affect actual job insecurity directly. If job insecurity enters the union objective function, then a successful bargaining process would decrease the job insecurity of its members. On the other hand, a union-induced wage increase would have a disemployment effect within a simple neo-classical framework, thereby increasing job insecurity. Finally, if unions reduce the productivity and profitability of firms, one could see more plant closures or firm failures which would also increase job insecurity (Freeman & Kleiner 1999) .
There is a theoretical literature suggesting that, in a dynamic setting, the presence of a union can directly impact layoffs. For example, Trejo (1993) proposes a simple dynamic framework where layoffs increase because the union tries to stabilize working hours and union membership using overtime pay. The exit-voice model predicts that unions reduce quits, which implies that firms cannot simply rely on normal attrition to reduce their workforce, and as such, they may be forced to rely more on layoffs. There is some empirical evidence (Medoff 1979 , Blau & Kahn 1983 , Pearce 1983 , Montgomery 1991 suggesting that firms with unionized workers may rely more on layoffs than their non-unionized counterparts.
This paper investigates the causes of the positive correlation between union membership and current job insecurity using American General Social Survey (GSS) data over the period. In particular, we explore whether the positive correlation arises from specific sectors, specific points in the business cycle, or whether this correlation is simply due to self-selection into unionized jobs (based on unobserved ability or inherent fear). We also investigate whether the correlation between union membership and perceived job insecurity changes with the exposure (i.e. with tenure) to a union.
2
To our knowledge, Bender & Sloane (1999) is the only paper whose focus has been on the causal link between union status and job insecurity perceptions.
3 Our paper differs from that of Bender & Sloane (1999) in two important ways. First, our dataset consists of 17 repeated cross-sections that cover a 30-year period. This allows us to use time varying instruments
2 If the differential is driven by the conflicting nature of collective bargaining or by the increased sensitivity to job security issues, then we could expect the differential to increase with union exposure. On the other hand, if a union represents the median voter, then we could expect the difference between unionized and non-unionized workers to be driven by junior workers.
3 The main focus of the existing job insecurity perception literature has been on determining whether perceptions of job insecurity have changed over time (Aaronson & Sullivan 1998 , Schmidt 1999 , Green et al. 2000 , Linz & Semykina 2008 , Brochu & Zhou 2009 ). There also exists a related (and extensive) literature that looks at the link between union membership and job satisfaction (Borjas 1979 , Bender & Sloane 1998 .
(e.g. changes in labor laws, and unionization rates at the state level). 4 We are also able to take full advantage of the richness of the attitudinal (i.e. opinion) information in the GSS. We can, for example, proxy for an individual's personal traits and perceived employer-employer relations, and thus deal with aspects of worker/firm heterogeneity. The many cross sections also allow us the see whether the union/non-union differential in perceived job insecurity varies across the business cycle as some of the objective data would suggest (Pearce 1983) . Second, our paper is the first to explore the causal link between union membership and perceived job insecurity for the United States-a country that experienced a dramatic decline in unionization rates over the last forty years (Farber 1990 , Hirsch 2008 . We can therefore examine the extent to which perceived job insecurity is linked to the union environment. In particular, we can see if the union/non-union perception differential changed with the decline of unions in the United States.
We find, as in previous North American studies (Aaronson & Sullivan 1998 , Brochu & Zhou 2009 , that union members are more likely to be insecure about both their current and future job prospects after controlling for confounding factors. Over the 1978-2008 period, union members are about 3.5 percentage points more likely to feel insecure about their current job. This difference is significant as the average level of insecurity was only 10.5 percent in the non-union sector. The difference is also significant for the insecurity about future jobs.
Our evidence-both with respect to our instrumental variables approach and proxy variables approach-suggest that self-selection is not driving our finding that union workers are relatively more insecure about their current job. We find that the positive correlation is localized in the primary and secondary sectors, and is counter-cyclical in nature. Interestingly, import penetration does not explain the perception differential found in the manufacturing sector. Finally, we do not find any evidence to support the claim that job insecurity perceptions changed with the decline of unions in the United States. There continued to be a counter-cyclical relationship in the manufacturing sector well after the dramatic decline in unionization of the 1970s and 1980s. We find some (weak) evidence that union members' perceived job insecurity increases (relative to non-union members) with union exposure, but the results should be interpreted with caution as the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms between union and tenure, and tenure squared and union are not statistically significant.
The next section describes the GSS data used in this paper while Section 3 presents the empirical strategies used to address the potential endogeneity issue related to union membership. Sections 4 presents our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Data
We use the American General Social Survey over the 1978-2008 period. There are two advantages to using the GSS: 1) there are many years of job perception data which makes it possible to use time-variant state-level characteristics as instruments; and 2) the GSS asks respondents their views on a variety of topics, from very specific (e.g. perceptions of employee-employer relations) to more general (e.g. political views). The presence of these variables will allow us to address the endogeneity of union status in ways that are not possible with other more traditional labor data sources like the Current Population Survey (CPS). The GSS is a repeated cross section dataset; the same survey is repeated over time, but with different respondents in each survey year. Most importantly, the GSS consistently ask respondents two job insecurity perception questions (Davis et al. 2009 The GSS also gathers a broad range of social and demographic information. Note, however, that it identifies union membership, and not the broader measure of union coverage. Fortunately, the difference is very small in the U.S. (Card et al. 2003) .
We restrict our sample to private-sector workers who are 18 to 64 years of age and are not self-employed. The self-employed were excluded because the process that determines job insecurity for both subjective and objective measures, is very different for them. Public sector employees were also removed because unions play a different role in the public sector, with union activity restrictions, for instances on wage determination and on the right to strike, that are not present in the private sector (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006) . 5 We impose an upper age restriction of 64 years of age so as to abstract from retirement issues. Finally, individuals with missing information on gender, age, education, part-time status, union status, and industry classification are also excluded-these individuals represent only 1.77 percent of the original sample. Our restricted sample consists of 7,519 individual observations over the 1978-2008 period.
We have data for the following 17 years : 1978, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 
Empirical Approach
The benchmark econometric model takes the form of a probit model
where insecure * it is the latent perceived job insecurity for individual i in period t, and it is the normally distributed error term. We observe the binary variable insecure it which equals one if the latent variable is greater than zero (i.e. the job is perceived to be insecure), and zero otherwise. union it is a dummy variable that equals one if the worker is a union member and zero otherwise. Finally, X it is a vector of individual and job characteristics, and region and time dummies.
We explore two measures of perceived insecurity: insecurity with respect to the current job, and insecurity with respect to the future job. For the current job, the insecurity dummy equals one if the respondent thinks that it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will lose his/her job or be laid off over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise). For the future job, the insecurity dummy equals one if the respondent thinks that finding a job with the same income and fringe benefits that he/she now has would not be easy at all (and zero otherwise).
Econometric Issues
Two important econometric issues need to be addressed. The first difficulty arises from the fact that our dependent variable is subjective, while the second comes from the potential selection into unionized jobs. We discuss these issues below. Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) argue that subjective measures can be affected by the wording and the order of the survey questions, as well as by the potential 'instability' of attitudes. In theory, these problems could be serious enough to render such measures unreliable for regression analysis. We do not believe that these potential problems are of serious concern in our case. The wording of our questions of interest has stayed the same since the GSS started asking them in 1978. The choice of answers offered to respondents has also been stable over time. The job insecurity perception questions tend to be asked early in the survey, prior to other perception questions. As such, one does not need to worry that the respondent will try to be consistent with answers given to other perception questions. Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) also warn against the use of subjective measures when the respondents could have unstable-changing drastically over a short period of time-or no attitudes toward the question of interest. Our empirical results suggest that the perceived job insecurity is stable to the extent that our results are in line with those looking at actual job insecurity. For example, perceived job insecurity is inversely related to education, and positively correlated with the unemployment rate. We address these concerns in more details in the Appendix.
The second issue is related to self-selection. It is possible that the union effect observed in the data is spurious, i.e. it is due to endogeneity problems. Aaronson & Sullivan (1998) state that "workers who are more insecure about their future employment are more likely to join a union." Workers may also choose to join/form a union based on their ability. In addition, Union Determination models (e.g. the Supply and Demand model (Schnabel 2003) , and the Queuing model (Farber 1983) , emphasize the endogenous aspect of union status. An increase in perceived job insecurity at the firm level, (e.g. due to mismanagement, unfair labor practices) could also make the non-union worker prefer a unionized environment.
Given the repeated cross sectional nature of our data, we cannot include an individual fixed effect term in our regression model. We have to use a different approach to cope with the self-selection issue. The richness of the GSS allows for two empirical strategies to deal with potential self-selection: a proxy approach and an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The time-series aspect of the GSS allows for the use of instruments that rely on fluctuations in state-level characteristics. In particular, we used both (together and separately) rightto-works laws and state-level union prevalence as instruments. Another key strength of the GSS data is the attitudinal (i.e. opinion) information. The availability of such information allows us to complement our IV-approach with an alternative strategy for dealing with potential differences between unionized and non-unionized workers. We used the attitudinal information (e.g. importance of job security) to proxy for an individual's personal traits, and thus deal with some aspects of worker heterogeneity. Combining these two fundamentally different strategies will shed light on the likelihood that the positive correlation between union membership and perceived job insecurity is due to worker self-selection.
Results
In this section, we start by presenting the results from estimating equation (1), and then present the results from our IV and proxy approaches-two strategies attempting to deal with potential endogeneity issues.
Tables 2 and 3 present the probit marginal effects from estimating equation (1) with current and future job insecurity measures as dependent variables, respectively.
7 Controls are added sequentially, from columns (1) to (4) to see whether the union coefficient estimate is robust to changes in specification. Columns (1) to (4) all suggest that the union effect is economically and statistically significant. Union members are between 3.1 and 3.9 percentage points more likely to feel insecure about their current job than their non-unionized counterparts, which is significant given that the average level of insecurity was only 10.5 percent in the non-union sector. Finally, while the estimates presented in columns (1) to (4) are based on a broad industry classification, column (5) presents results from an identical specification to column (4) with the exception that we used a much narrower industry classification (3-digit industry classification). 8 The narrower classification does not affect our results.
7 Using a probit model or a linear probability model gives very similar results. Table 2 when a linear probability model is used, instead of a probit. For Table 2 and all subsequent tables, we rely on weighted standard errors. We also tried clustering at the region-year level. The standard errors are of similar magnitude.
8 Note that the probit estimation drops observations from industries in which all, or none of the workers fear for their job. This is why the sample size drops from 7,436 to 6,659. Again, note that the union coefficient estimate is very similar to the one obtained from a linear probability model that retains all 7,436 observations. The 3-digit industry classification in the GSS is based on the 1970 and 1980 Census Industry Classifications. As some classes have changed when moving from the 1970 to the 1980 classification, we interact industry with a dummy equal to 1 for observations for which we only have the 1980 classification so that the 1970 and 1980 classifications with the same identifier (i.e. numerical code) are allowed to represent different industries.
Although we do not show the coefficients estimates for all control variables, their signs are in line with expectations and with other studies that have looked at job security perception. For example, while more educated individuals and older individuals fear less for their job, part time workers and blacks tend to fear more.
In Table 3 , we investigate whether union workers think that it would be hard for them to find a job with similar pay and benefits if they were to be laid off. If unions conferred a rent to their members, then we could imagine that they would be more likely to be insecure about their future job than similar non-unionized workers. Table 3 confirms this hypothesis: unionized workers are generally more than 15 percentage points more likely to fear for their future job. This difference is large considering that 35.4 percent of non-union workers are insecure about their future job prospects.
Since the more surprising finding is that unionized workers are more likely to fear for their present job, we now investigate whether this finding could be due to self-selection.
Instrumental-Variables Approach
We estimated equation (1) using a set of instruments to tackle the potential endogeneity problem coming from the union variable. Table 4 presents the IV-estimation results (based on the specification of column (4) in Table 2 ) using two instruments. The state unionization rate should not directly affect an individual's job insecurity once we control for her/his job industry and labor market conditions (controlled for using year effects), but should be correlated with the probability that an employee is unionized.
9 The estimated effect of union membership on insecurity is still positive when we use state unionization rate as an instrument. However, as in many cases where the instrument does not vary at the individual level, the estimate is imprecise. The estimate of the union parameter is 0.202 with standard errors equal to 0.126-the p-value being 0.111. Not surprisingly, the instrument passes the first-stage (rule-of-thumb) test as the F-statistic is clearly above 10 (Staiger & Stock 1997) . The estimated union effect is, in our opinion, too large to be credible. However, one should take into account that the standard errors are relatively large. If the main endogeneity problem comes from self-selection (from 'worriers') into unionized jobs, we believe that our instrument is valid as it should not be correlated with the error term once we control for the state of the labor market (which is done here using time fixed-effects). We obtain similar results when we control for the region-or state-level unemployment rates.
We have also used right-to-work (RTW) laws-alone and combined with the unionization rate-as instruments since they are expected to decrease the likelihood of union membership. Again, the estimated effect of union membership on insecurity stays positive. In the case where RTW is used alone, although the estimate is large (0.412), it is only statistically significant at a 10 percent confidence level (s.e. = 0.243). When combining the unionization rate and the RTW laws as instruments, the estimated effect is 0.221 with standard errors equal to 0.125. Overall, the instrumental-variables estimation does not suggest that selfselection is a main factor behind our findings in Table 2 .
Proxy Approach
As previously discussed, we do not believe that opinions of respondents make good instruments, but they can, however, be used as proxy variables. As is the case with ability in a Mincerian wage equation, we recognize that there are no perfect proxies; there will probably remain some unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with union status. If the evidence, when using a series of proxies, points systematically in the same direction (and it does) then the proxy approach, albeit imperfect, still provides useful evidence in determining whether (or not) the union effect is an artifact of self selection. Note that, although the GSS asks a variety of opinion questions, many of them are only asked in select years. As such, our proxy approach will consist of estimating the effect of each proxy separately.
The 1985, 1991 and 1993 surveys ask respondents to rank what matters most in a job. The choices include 'no danger of being fired', 'high income', 'chance of advancement', 'short working hours', and 'work gives a sense of accomplishment'. By including a variable that accounts for whether an individual values job security, one can directly tackle the issue raised by Aaronson & Sullivan (1998) who believe that insecure workers self-select into union jobs. Table 5 presents the effect of controlling for the importance of job security on the union coefficient estimate. We tried two different ways of controlling for the importance of job security.
10 The sign of the importance of job security is positive, but it does not affect the union finding.
We tried a variety of other controls to account for whether the respondent was a 'worrier', including whether the respondent tended to worry about little things, whether he/she felt safe at home, and whether he/she would be afraid to walk alone at night. Again, the inclusion of these variables did not affect our findings. Although not an opinion variable, we also tried to account for whether the respondent had been unemployed in the recent past. This could affect the workers perception of job security (the individual could become more fearful) which in turn could affect his/her decision to join the union sector. The variable that accounted for past unemployment spells was statistically significant in our regression, but the union coefficient did not change.
Finally, firm-specific characteristics could affect job insecurity levels, which could also influence workers' decisions to form (or join) a union. The quality of a firm's management team is a prime example. Recent GSS surveys ask respondents about the quality of employeremployee relations in their workplace, allowing us to see whether poor employer-employee relations could explain the observed correlation between union membership and perceived job insecurity. As shown in Table 5 , we control for poor relations by including a binary variable that equals one if the respondent says that the relations are quite bad or very bad, and zero otherwise. The relations variable was economically and statistically significant, but as was the case with our other proxy variables, its inclusion did not affect our findings with respect to the impact of union membership on insecurity perceptions. Table 5 does reveal, however, that the union effect is sensitive to the choice of sample years. More precisely, the effect appears to be counter-cyclical; when we focus more on expansionary periods, as is the case when controlling for employer-employee relations (i.e. columns (4) and (5)), the union effect is muted.
11 We further investigate the cyclicality of the 'union membership effect' in the next sub-section.
Potential Sources of the Differential
Empirical evidence suggests that the presence of unions can result in more layoffs. Medoff (1979) and Blau & Kahn (1983) , for example, found a significant union effect in the manufacturing sector. 12 Pearce (1983) examined the link between unionism and cyclical behavior, and found the sensitivities of employment to excess demand were relatively greater for union members. Table 6 examines whether these sectorial and cyclical differences are also present in the subjective data. The first set of results in Table 6 (columns (1) through (3)) is for the full sample, the second (columns (4) through (6)) and third (columns (7) through (9)) sets are for the nonrecessionary and recessionary years, respectively. Within each set, we investigate whether the union effect is homogeneous across industries by including interaction terms. For these specifications, the union coefficient estimate (e.g. 0.070 under column (3)) represents the union effect for the secondary sector industry. The interaction terms (e.g. Primary Sector*Union) capture differences in the union effect as compared to the effect in the secondary sector.
Focussing on the full sample, one can see that the positive correlation between union membership and perceived job insecurity comes from the primary and the secondary sectors. Union members in the manufacturing sector are between 7.0 to 7.1 percentage points more likely to feel insecure about their present job than non-union members-a difference that is economically very significant. For the tertiary sector (transportation and communications, and other services) there is essentially no difference between union and non-union workers. These sectoral differences remain essentially unchanged when one splits the sample into recession and non-recessionary years. What does change, however, is that the (union) insecurity differential in the manufacturing sector rises dramatically in recessionary periods.
We also tried controlling for cyclicality by using the full sample, but adding the monthly regional (or state level) unemployment rate (UR) as a control (instead of year fixed effects). The UR coefficient was both economically and statistically insignificant, and did not affect the union findings. The UR coefficient estimate became significant, however, when the year dummies were excluded. As such, job insecurity perceptions are correlated with the unemployment rate, but the link disappears once year dummies are included in the regression model, possibly because of insufficient variation in the unemployment rate within regions. Adding an unemployment rate-union interaction term, however, does make a difference. The interaction term is positive and statistically significant. As was the case when we split our sample into recessionary and non-recessionary years, we find that the manufacturing sector drives the union effect. Import penetration can have an impact on plant survival and employment growth (Bernard et al. 2006 , Khandelwal 2010 ), so we explored whether it could explain why we find a union/non-union difference in job insecurity in the manufacturing sector. Table 7 presents the results when an import penetration variable and its interaction with union status are included as additional regressors.
13 Given that the trade data were only available up to 2005, and there are no GSS survey in this year, we restricted our analysis to the 1978-2004
13 Import penetration is defined as in Bertrand (2004) . Import data is available at the Standard Industry Classification levels. The GSS, however, used the Census classification. The early GSS surveys relied on the 3-digit 1970 Census Industry Classification (CIC70), and starting in 1988, the GSS moved to the 3-digit 1980 Census Industrial Classification (CIC80). To construct our combined dataset, we relied on Schott's Standard Industry Classification (SIC87) trade data and the following two crosswalks: a SIC87 to CIC80 crosswalk to make the trade data compatible with the GSS data; and a CIC70 to CIC80 crosswalk to create a uniform industry classification (i.e. CIC80) across GSS surveys. More details on both the trade data and the crosswalks can be found in the Appendix.
period. The import penetration coefficient estimate is statistically insignificant. The same applies for the interaction term. We also tried a specification where we included the change in import penetration from period t − k and period t for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 (and its interaction with union status), and found very similar results as in Table 7 . These findings would seem to indicate that competitive pressure (as measured by import penetration) cannot explain why union workers feel more insecure about their jobs. As a final robustness check, we allowed low-wage and high-wage countries (as defined in Kandilov (2010) ) to have their own 'import-penetration effect'-again, the union effect is unchanged.
As previously mentioned, unions may 'manufacture' perception of job insecurity. Union leaders may want their members to feel more insecure and therefore more dependent upon the union for security. It is not unreasonable to expect this perception effect to increase with union exposure. This would suggest that the union/non-union differential in perceived job insecurity (all else being equal) should increase with tenure. On the other hand, if unions represent the preferences of the median 'voter', the difference in perceived job security between unionized and non-unionized workers could be concentrated among more juniors workers (Blau & Kahn 1983) . Therefore, examining how perceived insecurity changes along the tenure dimension can shed some light on the potential driven forces behind the union/nonunion perception differential.
Unfortunately, the GSS has information about tenure only for a few select years (1991, 2002, and 2006) . We did investigate whether the 'union effect' changes with (a quadratic function of) tenure, but the results should be interpreted with caution as the sample size becomes small (1,036 observations of which only 161 are unionized). Not surprisingly, the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant. However, we do find (as in Bender & Sloane (1999) ) that for low and very high levels of tenure (i.e. below 3 and above 24 years of service), perceived job insecurity is more prevalent among non-unionized workers. Interestingly, our results suggest that for the first 13 years of service-more than 75 percent of our workers have less than 13 years of service-, union workers become relatively more insecure with each additional year of tenure.
14 This would tend to support the idea that job insecurity increases with union exposure, but again the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant.
Concluding Remarks
This paper seeks to investigate why we observe a positive correlation between union membership and job insecurity. In particular, we try to see whether this correlation is simply due to self-selection into unionized jobs. Using the American General Social Survey over the 1978-2008 period, we find that union members are about 3.5 percentage points more likely to feel insecure about their current job relative to their non-unionized counterparts. Our evidence-using both IV and proxy approaches-suggests that this effect is not due to self-selection.
The positive correlation appears to localized in the primary and secondary (manufacturing) sectors. Interestingly, this latter finding is not driven by import penetration, but is counter-cyclical in nature; the union/non-union perception differential increases as the economy worsens.
Finally, there is no evidence of a structural change in job security perception differential accompanying the well-documented decline in unionization rates in the United States. There continued to be a counter-cyclical relationship in the manufacturing sector well after the dramatic decline in unionization of the 1970s and 1980s-as evident by the positive and economically significant union/non-union perception differential of the recessionary periods of the early 1990s and late 2000s.
This paper suggests two promising avenues of future research. The first would be to further focus on the perception itself. As previously mentioned, we find some weak evidence that the perceived job insecurity differential increases with tenure. However, data limitations do not allow us to fully address the causal link between heightened insecurity perception and the length of union exposure. This would require a source of data that is richer along the tenure dimension.
A second avenue would to explore the link between unionization and actual job insecurity using administrative data. In our study, we cannot make a distinction between fears of temporary versus permanent layoffs. Unions may be more willing to accept layoffs as opposed to, say, a reduction in hours-as long as they are temporary in nature. Hence, it is possible that our results are, in part, due to the type of job layoff that is more likely to affect unionized versus non-unionized workers. The use of administrative data sets would allow the researcher to investigate whether unionized firms have, over the past thirty years, disproportionately used temporary layoffs relative to non-unionized firms.
A Appendix Public Sector
As discussed in Section 2, we excluded the public sector because unions may play a different role (e.g. on wage negotiation and the right to strike). In this subsection, we examine whether the inclusion of the public sector changes any of our main findings. Table A .2 presents the probit marginal effects from estimating equation (1)-using present job insecurity as dependent variable-on our sample of respondents including public-sector workers. As with Table 2 , we add controls sequentially.
One can draw two conclusions when expanding the sample to include public-sector workers: 1) The key findings about union membership are still present. The union coefficient remains positive (although slightly dampened), and both economically and statistically significant. When we allow for the union effect to vary by sector (columns (5) and (6)), we still find that the primary and secondary sectors drive our results; and 2), the union effect is negative in the public sector. If it were the case that insecure workers self-select into union jobs, one should also have seen a negative, and not positive, correlation between unionization and job insecurity perception. As such, we believe this to be one further piece of evidence to support our claim that self-selection is not the driving force behind our results.
Weights
In this subsection we explore alternative weighting strategies. We compare three approaches: 1) weighting the data so that the weights in survey year t add up to number of observations in year t ('Weight 1'). This weighting approach ensures that larger surveys play a larger role in the estimation; 2) re-weighting the data so that the weights sum to one in each survey year ('Weight 2'); this means that each survey, irrespective of its sample size, plays an equal role in the estimation; and 3) using equally weighted observations ('Unweighted'). Table A .3 compares the estimates presented in Table 2 , obtained using our weighting strategy ('Weight 1'), to two alternative weighting strategies (i.e 'Weight 2' and 'Unweighted'). Table A .3 shows that the choice of weighting strategy does not materially affect our findings.
Subjective Measure and Measurement Error
As we are using a subjective measure as dependent variable, we need to address some potential concerns raised by some economists (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001) on estimating regressions using such measure. We address a series of potential threats below. Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) mention that the wording and the ordering of the questions could affect how survey respondents answer them, which could make our job insecurity measure unreliable. This potential problem should not be of great concern in our case. The wording for the current-job question has stayed the same over the years, and the question clearly measures the outcome of interest, i.e. the perceived likelihood of job loss (or lay off) over the next twelve months. A similar argument holds true for the future job question.
For this question, the type of new job is also precisely defined-a job with approximately the same income and fringe benefits as you now have. We believe that the job insecurity questions are less open to interpretation as compared to other perception measures such as happiness or job satisfaction. The respondents are offered four choices of answers: very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, and not likely at all. The recording of answers may be less precise than in the Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE) where probabilistic choices are given (Manski & Straub 2000) , but it is more precise than the yes or no answers found in the Canadian Gallup (Brochu & Zhou 2009 ). Most importantly, the choice of answers has remained unchanged since 1977. Finally, the ordering of the questions should not create any problem here since both job insecurity questions are always asked early in the survey and typically follow standard employment questions. Hence, the GSS seems, in our opinion, to minimize the any potential 'cognitive problems' linked to the use of subjective measures.
A second set of problems mentioned in Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) is related to the potential instability of the attitude (or the absence of an attitude) toward the question of interest. The questions we are interested in are not related to 'obscure' subjects; we expect workers to be familiar with the concept of job insecurity, and to have some opinion about their own job insecurity. In fact, many of the GSS respondents have 'strong' opinions about their perceived job insecurity: 66.3 percent of the respondents in our sample either answered 'very likely' or 'not at all likely', suggesting that the individuals in our sample do have an attitude toward job insecurity. Now, if perceptions were unstable it would have affected the estimated effect of other explanatory variables in the job insecurity perception regressions. However, other estimated coefficients (other than for union status) have the 'right' signs, i.e. they are intuitive and in-line with objective data. Perceptions of job insecurity, for example, are found to be inversely related with educational attainment (Brochu & Zhou 2009 , Schmidt 1999 . Other intuitive and consistent findings include: part-time workers feeling relatively less secure about their job; white-collar workers feeling relatively more secure than blue collar workers; the tertiary sector workers feeling more secure than primary and secondary sector workers. That insecurities tend to mirror the business cycle, i.e. decrease in periods of expansion only to bounce back in periods of recession, would also go against the argument that perceptions are unstable over time. Furthermore, a recent paper by Bryson et al. (2009) found that perceived job insecurity reacts negatively to an increase in actual job security, presenting more evidence that our subjective measure is stable. Finally, the correlation between perceptions of insecurity and subsequent job loss should be low if perceptions were in fact unstable. Yet, researchers (Campbell et al. 2007 , Stephens 2004 ) have found a strong correlation between perceptions of job insecurity and future unemployment spells.
International Trade Data and Crosswalks
We constructed our import penetration variable using Schott's (2010) trade data. These data are available on Schott's International Economics Resource Page which can be accessed through the NBER website. Schott extends Feenstra's trade data up to 2005. The dataset contains information on U.S. manufacturing exports, imports and shipments at the year, country and 4-digit SIC87 level. A more detailed description of the data can be found in Schott (2010) .
Crosswalks
• CIC70 to CIC80 crosswalk; based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989), we created a CIC70 to CIC80 crosswalk. The changes in industry classification across time were modest in nature, particularly in the manufacturing sector. As such, it was possible to find a compatible CIC80 match for all but seven CIC70 codes.
• SIC87 to CIC80 crosswalk; the 3-digit Census Industry classification is based on the 4-digit Standard Industry classification (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989). We used an exact SIC87 to CIC80 correspondence that is available on the BLS website. The correspondence can be accessed through the following BLS link address: http://ferret.bls. census.gov/items/value/valu 59185.htm. Given that the Current Population Survey (CPS) also relied on the CIC80 for the 1983-1991 period, the same exact correspondence (with detailed accompanying notes) can also be found in the CPS codebooks (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) made available on the BLS website. Notes. The summary statistics are weighted. The weights are normalized to sum up to the number of observations in each survey. Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will lose his/her job or be laid off over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise). Weighted standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks that finding a job with another employer with approximately the same income and fringe benefits he/she now has would not be easy at all (and zero otherwise). Weighted standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will lose his/her job or be laid off over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise). The estimated models are based on the specification of column (4) in Table 2 . The reported F-statistics are from a joint test of significance on the excluded instruments. Weighted standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 1985, 1991 and 1993 only 1989, 1991, 1998, 2002 2004 and 2006 only (1) Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will lose his/her job or be laid off over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise). We used three different measures to control for the importance of job security. 'Importance of Job Security 1' equals one if job security is ranked most important, and zero otherwise. 'Importance of Job Security 2' equals one if job security is most or next most important, and zero otherwise. To control for employer-employee relations, our bad relations variable equals one if the respondent considers that employer-employee relations are quite bad or very bad, and zero otherwise. Weighted standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (excluding 1983, 1991 and 2008) (1983, 1991 and 2008 only) (1)
(8) Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will lose his/her job or be laid off over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise). The interaction term coefficient estimates were obtained using the methodology proposed in Ai and Norton (2003) . Weighted standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will lose his/her job or be laid off over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise). Weighted standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Notes. Table A .3 compares the estimates presented in Table 2 , obtained using our weighting strategy (Weight 1), to two alternative weighting strategies (i.e 'Weight' 2 and 'Unweighted'). Estimates under 'Weight 1' are obtained using weights that sum to the sample size of each (yearly) survey. Estimates under 'Weight 2' are obtained using weights that sum to 1 for each year of the survey. The interaction term coefficient estimates were obtained using the methodology proposed in Ai and Norton (2003) . Weighted standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
